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1  The nature of the problem
The problem of changed circumstances arises when the factors on which 
contracting parties had based their consensus are fundamentally changed. 
This upsets the equilibrium of contractual exchange, since performance now 
becomes more onerous for one of the parties. The result will usually be a 
loss for one party and possibly even a windfall gain for the other. This issue 
of changed circumstances, or hardship, as it is often referred to, is dealt with 
by many leading Western legal systems. Countries such as Germany and the 
Netherlands deal with this problem in terms of their civil codes.1 English law 
has the doctrine of frustration, as does the US, although discharge is far more 
readily permitted in the latter jurisdiction.2 In the realm of international 
trade there are rules on hardship contained in the Unidroit Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (“PICC”), as well as in the Principles 
of European Contract Law (“PECL”) and the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (“DCFR”).3 Comparative study thus reveals that this is a widely 
acknowledged problem and that leading legal systems address it with their 
own idiosyncratic rules.
The position is different in South Africa, however. South Africa has a mixed 
legal system, in that it is based on a mixture of seventeenth century Roman 
Dutch law in the civilian tradition as well as significant tracts of English law, 
and also recognises the doctrine of precedent, so that these sources have 
* I would like to thank Prof Tjakie Naudé and Prof Dale Hutchison for their very helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper.
1 German Civil Code § 313 (Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage which means “interference with the basis of 
the transaction”); Civil Code of the Netherlands art 6:258. Other European civil law countries such as 
Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Austria have similar provisions in their civil codes. Notable exceptions 
are France, Belgium and Luxembourg. See generally Lando & Beale Principles of European Contract 
Law I & II (2000) 328.
2 A succinct summary of the English approach can be found in J Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV [1990] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 1 8 (“The Super Servant Two”). For the US approach see § 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code and §§ 261-272 of the Second Restatement of Contracts. A good authority on both jurisdictions is 
Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure (2004). 
3 Hardship is dealt with in the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (“PICC”) art 
6.2.1-6.2.; the Principles of European Contract Law (“PECL”) at art 6:111; the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (“DCFR”) Book III art 1:110.
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been updated by decisions of our courts over the years.4 South African law 
recognises discharge of a contract based on impossibility,5 but does not as 
a general principle address any change of circumstances which falls short of 
this.6 Comparatively our country thus lags behind other nations, in that it 
fails to make provision for a widely acknowledged problem. What lessons can 
South Africa learn from comparative study in this field and is there a solution 
to this problem which is appropriate to the specific requirements of the South 
African situation?
The first question to be addressed is a normative one, however. What is the 
underlying justification for having rules on changed circumstances and do 
these types of considerations apply in the South African context?
2  The requirement of good faith
The inclusion of the doctrine of Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage under the 
2002 amendments to the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”) codified the law 
which had arisen from academic theory and had been adopted by multiple 
decisions of the German courts.7 In its original form the doctrine was 
known as Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage (collapse of the foundation of the 
transaction) and its application was based on the general good faith provision 
of the BGB, which appears at § 242.8 This good faith basis of a change of 
circumstances doctrine is not unique to German law. The Dutch civil code 
makes the operation of its change of circumstances provision dependent upon 
a finding by a court that this is what “reasonableness and fairness” require.9 
Even in the English common law, with its hesitancy to recognise good faith 
as an independent ground for intervention in contracts,10 the doctrine of 
4 See generally, Zimmermann “‘Double Cross’: Comparing Scots and South African Law” in Zimmermann, 
Visser & Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective (2004) 1.
5 Peters, Flamman and Co v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427 434; Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports 
Authority v Owner of MV Snow Crystal 2008 4 SA 111 (SCA) para 28; Van der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, 
Reinecke & Lubbe Contract – General Principles 3 ed (2007) 541; Christie The Law of Contract in South 
Africa (2006) 472.
6 Hersman v Shapiro 1926 TPD 367 at 375 - 377; Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v Owner of MV 
Snow Crystal 2008 4 SA 111 (SCA) para 28; Van der Merwe et al Contract 542; Christie Law of Contract 
93, 472-473. It should be noted, however, that in the context of credit agreements, the Legislature is 
moving in the direction of recognising subjective impossibility of performance (or impracticability) in 
limited circumstances. Under s 86 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 a consumer may apply to a debt 
counsellor to be declared over-indebted. According to this section, headed “application for debt review”, 
a consumer may approach a debt counsellor to be declared over-indebted and his debt may be reviewed, 
based on his or her subjective financial position. This presents an opportunity to renegotiate a contract 
which has become subjectively impossible or more difficult for a debtor to perform and evidences a shift 
by the Legislature in the direction of allowing discharge or renegotiation of contracts struck by changed 
circumstances.
7 Markesinis, Unberath & Johnston The German Law of Contract (2006) 324; Lorenz “Contract 
Modification as a Result of Change of Circumstances” in Beatson & Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and 
Fault in Contract Law (1995) 357 370.
8 Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 322-324.
9 Burgerlijk Wetboek (“BW”) art 6:258. The formula is expressed in the original as redelijkheid en 
billijkheid. The quoted translation is taken from Warendorf, Thomas & Curry-Sumner The Civil Code of 
the Netherlands (2009) 714.
10 See Brownsword “Positive, Negative, Neutral: The Reception of Good Faith in English Contract Law” 
in Brownsword, Hird & Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract – Concept and Context (1999) 13. 
Brownsword identifies positive, negative and neutral views in respect of the role of good faith in English 
law, but notes that the majority of English lawyers favour the negative or neutral view (25).
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frustration has been developed to achieve a “just and reasonable result” 
and “to do what is reasonable and fair”.11 Indeed what emerges clearly from 
comparative study of rules on changed circumstances is that they have a 
common normative basis in what might loosely be described as a desire to do 
what is fair.
Consider the argument of Fried, who asserts that in an instance of 
frustration a gap-filling process, which seeks to make provision for the results 
of the occurrence of an unforeseen event, must take place.12 In the process 
of apportioning losses and gains, Fried argues, the principle of sharing 
pertains.13 Another way of expressing this view might be that it is not just14 
to hold a party bound to a contract after a frustrating event, “because the 
circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing 
radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract.”15 The 
result of enforcing the promise would be to apportion the unforeseen losses or 
gains to one party alone. This would not be fair, since the burden of a change 
occasioned by an unforeseen event would be allocated by chance. It is for this 
reason that rules which address the problem of changed circumstances are 
generally grounded in good faith.
In the South African jurisdiction, Van Huyssteen and Van der Merwe 
argued in 1990 for the problem of changed circumstances to be addressed 
based on the demands of good faith:
“In a system of contracts based on bona fides, a contractant should be entitled to proper conduct on 
the part of his co-contractant. …A change in circumstances surrounding a contract could then result 
in a refusal to enforce the contract or a specific term if insistence on its enforcement in spite of the 
changed circumstances is objectively not in good faith when the relationship between the contractants 
is considered.”16
Good faith is a far more contentious topic in South Africa than this extract 
suggests, however. In 1988 the Appellate Division (as the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was then known) buried the exceptio doli generalis, a Roman law 
mechanism which had been adopted in certain earlier decisions to outlaw 
bad faith conduct, in its Bank of Lisbon and South African Ltd v De Ornelas 
decision.17 Although Roman Dutch law had a strong grounding in good 
11 The Super Servant Two [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 8. 
12 Fried Contract as Promise (1981) 69-70.
13 69-70.
14 The concepts of “justice” and “fairness” will be used interchangeably in this paper. The reason for this 
approach is the connection drawn between these terms in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
In this judgment Ngcobo J stated that “[n]otions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness 
cannot be separated from public policy” (para 51). Later the same judge stated that “[t]he concepts of 
justice, reasonableness and fairness constitute good faith” (para 80). It would therefore appear that the 
Constitutional Court views these terms as interlinked, perhaps even as synonyms importing the same 
general idea.
15 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council 1956 AC 696 729.
16 Van Huyssteen & Van der Merwe “Good Faith in Contract: Proper Behaviour amidst Changing 
Circumstances” 1990 Stell LR 244 248-249.
17 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 607A-B. On the exceptio doli and its relationship with the doctrine of good faith in 
South African law see Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern 
Cross (1996) 217 217-236; Hutchison “Good Faith in the South African Law of Contract” in Brownsword, 
Hird & Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 213 213-222.
416 STELL LR 2010 3
Stellenbosch_Law_Review_2010-3_Text.indd   416 2010/12/15   1:33 PM
faith,18 the exact status of this doctrine in modern South African law was left 
in considerable doubt following this case. While good faith was an underlying 
value of South African contract law ensuring fair performance through inter 
alia playing a role in the interpretation of contracts, it had never been an 
independent device capable of being directly invoked.19 This had been the 
role which the exceptio doli generalis played, giving an outlet to the good 
faith principle.20
Soon after, however, the Appellate Division held that public policy required 
“the doing of simple justice between man and man.”21 Thus the concept of 
fairness in contracting was revived under the banner of public policy. Lubbe 
advocated equating this aspect of public policy with the concept of good 
faith22 and this eventually received the approval of a dissenting judge in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.23 This development was cut short by a decision 
of the SCA in 2002, however.24 In Brisley v Drotsky, the majority cited the 
following passage by Dale Hutchison:
“[G]ood faith may be regarded as an ethical value or controlling principle based on community 
standards of decency and fairness that underlies and informs the substantive law of contract. It 
finds expression in various technical rules and doctrines, defines their form, content and field of 
application and provides them with a moral and theoretical foundation. Good faith thus has a creative, 
a controlling and a legitimating or explanatory function. It is not, however, the only value or principle 
that underlies the law of contract; nor, perhaps, even the most important one.”25
This statement was confirmed by subsequent decisions of the SCA and 
that was where the matter stood for several years. In 2007 the Constitutional 
Court had occasion to pronounce on the issue of fairness in contracting. In 
Barkhuizen v Napier26 (“Barkhuizen”) a clause in a standard form contract 
placing a time limit on when an action could be brought under that contract 
was challenged on the basis of the constitutional right of access to the 
courts.27 This raised the question whether the Constitutional Court should 
develop the common law of contract to give effect to constitutional rights. 
The majority held that a constitutional challenge to a term of a contract must 
be brought under the banner of public policy, a concept informed by the rights 
18 Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross 220.
19 See for example: Paddock Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 1976 3 SA 16 (A); Tuckers Land and Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 22. See also 
Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross 240; Barnard-Naudé “‘Oh what a tangled web 
we weave…’ Hegemony, Freedom of Contract, Good Faith and Transformation – Towards a Politics of 
Friendship in the Politics of Contract” 2008 Constitutional Court Review 155 176.
20 See, generally, Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross; Hutchison “Good Faith in the 
South African Law of Contract” in Good Faith in Contract.
21 Sasfin v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9E-G.
22 Lubbe “Bona Fides, Billikheid en die Openbare Belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg” 1990 Stell 
LR 7 20-21.
23 Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA).
24 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). Confirmed in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA); 
South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 27.
25 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 22. This quotation is taken from Hutchison “Non-variation 
Clauses in Contract: Any Escape from the Shifren Straitjacket?” 2001 SALJ 720 743-744.
26 2007 5 SA 323 (CC).
27 S 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 
para 1.
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in the Bill of Rights.28 Of course there was a conflict here between the right 
to freedom of contract, which was also protected by public policy and the 
competing value of fairness in contracting.29 Ncgobo J ultimately held that the 
concept of contractual certainty had to be limited in the interests of fairness 
in contracting.30 As far as the concept of good faith went the Constitutional 
Court left its status open,31 but clearly chose to frame its decision in the 
language of public policy.32
What emerges from this decision is that the issue of fairness in contracting 
is waxing in South Africa. While good faith as discussed in the older cases 
may no longer be a viable avenue for redress, some have argued that the 
difference between the new public policy based value of fairness and the old 
concept of good faith is simply one of semantics.33 For present purposes this 
means that the inequity which would result from apportioning losses and gains 
consequent upon an unforeseen change of circumstances by chance is now 
against public policy and the newly entrenched requirements of fairness. Thus 
the argument of Van Huyssteen and Van der Merwe has been affirmed, but the 
appropriate terminology for the ground of redress is fairness in contracting, 
rather than good faith. This is a possible means of addressing the problem of 
changed circumstances as argued for here, but the use of a simple discretion 
to discharge contracts based on grounds of fairness does not seem entirely 
satisfactory.
Brand has offered a different, narrower interpretation of the Barkhuizen 
judgment:
“If we have learnt anything from what happened in the past in South African courts, it is this: 
imprecise and nebulous statements about the role of good faith, fairness and equity, which would 
permit idiosyncratic decision-making on the basis of what a particular judge regards as fair and 
equitable are dangerous. They lead to uncertainty and a dramatic increase in often pointless litigation 
and unnecessary appeals.”34
The problem with using the concept of fairness in contracting to provide 
redress in situations of changed circumstances is that it is a “nebulous” 
concept and leaves the question of whether to award redress entirely at the 
discretion of the presiding judge. This sentiment was echoed in a more recent 
pronouncement on the ambit of fairness in this context by Harms DP in a 
unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.35 In Bredenkamp v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd the Supreme Court of Appeal restricted 
the notion of fairness as set down in Barkhuizen with the statement that there 




32 Compare the argument of Glover “Lazarus in the Constitutional Court: An Exhumation of the exceptio 
doli generalis?” 2007 SALJ 449 456 who makes the point that the Constitutional Court deliberately chose 
to ground its doctrine of fairness in public policy rather than good faith.
33 Barnard-Naudé 2008 Constitutional Court Review 195-196.
34 Brand “The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The Influence 
of the Common Law and the Constitution” 2009 SALJ 89-90. Compare the statements of the majority 
of the SCA in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 24. Brand JA was a signatory of the majority 
decision in Brisley.
35 Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 54. 
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is no over-arching requirement of fairness in the enforcement of contractual 
provisions “if no public policy consideration found in the Constitution or 
elsewhere is implicated.”36 This means that the evaluation of contractual 
equity must remain focused around public policy and that an outlet for fairness 
should still be sought in the technical rules of contractual doctrine.
In the context of hardship something more concrete is thus required, 
preferably in the form of a rule which can set guidelines for the exercise 
of judicial discretion in appropriate situations. The South African Law 
Commission (“SALC”) had proposed in a 1998 report that the problem of 
changed circumstances be addressed by enacting legislation which would 
incorporate rules similar to what is today article 6:111 of the Principles of 
European Contract Law.37 This suggested legislative provision was included 
as a clause in a Bill granting courts the power to revise contracts on good 
faith grounds.38 The Bill was never enacted, however, and the momentum 
gained by Project 47 has largely been superseded by the enactment of the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, since this statute outlaws unfair contract 
terms, albeit in a consumer context.39 While it is possible that the Consumer 
Protection Act could be brought to bear on the present problem, this is a 
tenuous argument40 and more specific rules on changed circumstances are 
necessary in South Africa.
3  A new rule to deal with changed circumstances in South 
Africa
The new rule on changed circumstances should be introduced by the 
judiciary as a common law doctrine and should not take the form of legislation. 
The legislative arm of government has hesitated to enact legislation in this 
area, although it has been tabled for more than ten years.41 While this may 
be attributable to the controversial nature of the good faith doctrine – as 
evidenced by the opinion of Brand quoted above as well as the line of cases 
starting with Brisley v Drotsky – it appears that Parliament has failed to 
address this issue properly. Furthermore, rather than attempting to capture 
a change of circumstances doctrine in an immutable statute, a common law 
rule can be developed and adapted over time and is not constrained by the 
prescriptive meaning of statutory language. The Barkhuizen decision outlined 
above evidences a shift in thinking with regard to fairness in contracting and 
36 Para 50.
37 South African Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulation in Contracts and the Rectification of 
Contracts Project 47 Report (1998) 186-191.
38 Bill on the Control of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms. 
Attached as “Annexure A” to the SA Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulation in Contracts and the 
Rectification of Contracts Report 208.
39 See Chapter 2 Part G of the Consumer Protection Act.
40 Immediate objections to this proposal are that the Consumer Protection Act does not apply to contracts 
where the State or a juristic person with an income over a prescribed amount is the consumer. See s 5(2)
(a)-(b) of the Consumer Protection Act.
41 The exception in this regard is the process of debt review under the National Credit Act as described in n 
6 above.
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it is thus arguably at common law that the developments in this regard are 
taking place.
If the need for such a rule is accepted, the next question to arise is what 
content should the rule have? What categories of changed circumstances 
would trigger its operation and what would be the threshold test a change in 
circumstances would have to meet in order to invoke a remedy? Comparative 
solutions to these problems are myriad, as the few examples given in the 
introduction show.
As to the categories which would invoke redress, this paper will adopt the 
terminology used in the United States jurisdiction. Thus discharge should be 
granted for situations of impracticability, which occurs when performance 
becomes significantly more difficult or expensive, including a situation of 
actual impossibility of performance.42 This type of change in circumstances 
typically afflicts the supplier of goods or services.43 Market related increases 
in expense, or increased difficulty in supply due to industrial action or crop 
failure might be foreseeable events, against which a prudent businessperson 
would take precautions, but if such an event were to prove unforeseeable it 
would no longer be fair to hold the disadvantaged party bound to the contract. 
It is for this reason that impracticability is a ground for discharge in the US, 
provided the threshold test of the event being sufficiently unforeseeable is 
met. Redress is also permitted in other jurisdictions such as Germany and the 
Netherlands, where any change of circumstances can justify the application 
of the relevant civil code provisions, provided the threshold test is met.44 
English law does not permit redress on this ground,45 but this view seems to 
be isolated in the light of comparative study.
For South Africa to allow redress in a situation of impracticability would 
not be entirely foreign to our law. Although objective impossibility has always 
been the required threshold for discharge, certain authorities have always 
maintained that this is a “pragmatic” standard and depends on factors such 
as practical and economic expediency and fairness.46 For illustration of this 
point consider the statement in Moss v Smith:
“A man may be said to have lost a shilling when he had dropped it in deep water, though it might be 
possible by some very expensive contrivance to recover it.”47
If discharge is to be allowed where the cost of performance to the supplier 
has increased, then the converse situation where the value of the performance 
42 See the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615; the Second Restatement of Contracts § 261. The doctrine of 
impracticability in the US is usually traced back to the decision in Mineral Park Land Co v Howard 156 
P 458 (1916). See Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure 263.
43 Second Restatement of Contracts § 261, official comment (d); Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure 309.
44 In Germany the test is whether the parties would not have entered into the contract or would have entered 
on different terms if they had foreseen the change (§ 313(1)), whereas in the Netherlands the test is 
whether “reasonableness and fairness” require that a party can no longer be held bound to a contract in 
unmodified form.
45 Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd v CS Wilson & Co Ltd [1917] AC 495 510; British Movietonews Ltd v London 
and District Cinemas Ltd [1952] AC 166 185; Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure 290-291.
46 Van der Merwe et al Contract 188. See also De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg (1992) 85-86; Hutchison & 
Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa (2009) 382. 
47 Moss v Smith 1859 9 CB 94 103. De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 85-86 give a similar example of a 
valuable marble statue, which is lost beneath the ocean when the ship carrying it sinks.
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to the recipient has decreased should likewise be considered. This situation is 
generally referred to as frustration of the purpose of the contract. Obviously such 
purpose must be commonly held by both parties and must be the foundation on 
which the contract is built. These further requirements mean that discharge for 
frustration of purpose is difficult to invoke. Perhaps the most famous instance of 
discharge on this ground is the English case of Krell v Henry48 (“Krell”). There, 
a room overlooking Pall Mall in London had been hired by the defendant from 
which to watch the coronation procession of King Edward VII on 26 June 1902. 
A specially increased rate was charged for the hire of the room and it was to 
be used only during the day of the coronation and not during the night. It was 
thus clear that the common purpose of both parties was to hire a flat to view the 
procession. When this event was cancelled on 24 June, due to the sudden illness 
of the king, the lessee, Henry, refused to proceed with the contract. Krell sued 
for the outstanding rental, but was unsuccessful. The court held that the contract 
had been discharged by the collapse of its foundation.49
The concept of frustration of purpose is not known by that name in South 
Africa, but there have been similar cases where a commonly held supposition 
about the occurrence of a future event has failed to materialise.50 Although there 
is authority in case law that this type of supposition can void a contract,51 this 
has been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Van Reenen 
Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith NO52 (“Van Reenen Steel”). The merits of the specific 
device of the supposition in futuro aside, the conservative approach to changed 
circumstances applied by the SCA in Van Reenen Steel should not preclude 
development in this area given the new shift toward fairness in contracting. 
The concern of the courts that discharge should not be permitted too readily 
due to the failure of a motivating factor to materialise is relevant and, as Treitel 
notes with regard to the English jurisdiction, Krell is the only true case where 
discharge on the ground of frustration of purpose has ever been allowed.53
Thus the availability of a frustration of purpose type defence should be 
limited by a strict threshold test, but to have no possibility of discharge on this 
ground would not be fair to the contracting parties. If performance has truly 
become worthless to the recipient, then to make him bear this loss alone and 
to permit what might (as in Krell’s case) then be a windfall gain to the supplier 
would be unfair.54
What should be clear by this point is that the problem of changed 
circumstances brings two opposing concepts into conflict. On the one hand 
48 [1903] 2 KB 740.
49 754.
50 Williams v Evans 1978 1 SA 1170 (C); Hare’s Brickfields Ltd v Cape Town City Council 1985 1 SA 769 
(C); Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Motorcraft (Pty) Ltd 1981 1 SA 889 (N); Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith 
NO 2002 4 SA 264 (SCA).
51 Williams v Evans 1978 1 SA 1170 (C) 1174G-H; Osman v Standard Bank National Credit Corporation 
1985 2 SA 378 (C) 386C.
52 Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith NO 2002 4 SA 264 (SCA) para 8.
53 Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure 346. The US jurisdiction is slightly more lax in this regard, see 
Doherty v Monroe Eckstein Brewing Co 191 NYS 59 (1921); Industrial Development and Land Co v 
Goldschmidt 206 P 134 (1922); 20th Century Lites v Goodman 149 P 2d 88 (1944).
54 This would occur if the procession was rescheduled for a later date and Krell was allowed to let out his 
room at an enhanced price for a second time.
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there is the very real need to preserve contractual sanctity and not to permit 
discharge too readily. On the other there is the requirement of fairness, which 
requires that contractual certainty be limited where strict enforcement of an 
agreement would lead to injustice. Both these values are said to be protected 
by public policy in South Africa55 and both need to be weighed against each 
other in exercising discretion as to whether to allow discharge on the ground of 
changed circumstances. It is this fine balancing act which makes the threshold 
test as to when to permit redress for changed circumstances so important.
In formulating a common law rule in this vein for South Africa, regard 
should be had to comparative law. The English use a simple test as to whether 
there has been a “radical change in the obligation” in deciding whether 
to permit discharge under the doctrine of frustration.56 The contract is 
construed before and after the relevant change to see whether there has been a 
sufficiently significant change in the nature of the obligation.57
In the United States, the Second Restatement of Contracts asks whether 
there has been “the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which 
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made”.58 A similar test 
is applied in Germany, where the court must answer the question whether 
“circumstances which became the basis of a contract have significantly 
changed since the contract was entered into and if the parties would not have 
entered into the contract or would have entered into it with different contents 
if they had foreseen this change”.59 This type of test focuses on the motivating 
factors which caused the parties to enter the contract and asks whether there 
has been a significant change in these circumstances.
The Dutch approach shies away from formulating any sort of guidelines in 
this regard, other than simply to declare that a court may modify a contract 
“on the basis of unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the other 
party, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not expect 
the contract to be maintained in unmodified form.”60 This is perhaps the 
most obvious conferral of discretion on the judiciary to do as it sees fit in a 
particular case, although there is a similar exercise of discretion in the other 
examples shown above. If South Africa’s rule is to be based in considerations 
of fairness, clearly a large of dose of judicial discretion is going to be required 
to resolve a given case too. It is for this reason that a common law rule is 
preferable to a statutory instrument, since it can invoke the best elements of 
all the leading foreign law models. With this in mind, perhaps it is advisable 
to turn, as the SALC did, to supranational model rules, which are drafted with 
the intention of creating a generally applicable, ideal solution.
55 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57.
56 Davis Contractors v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696 729. It should be noted that 
“frustration” is a blanket term in English law and refers to discharge for changed circumstances in 
general.
57 McKendrick “Discharge by Frustration” in Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts I (2008) 1479 1487.
58 Compare the wording of the Second Restatement of Contracts §§ 261, 265.
59 § 313(1). Translation taken from the website for the Bundesministerium der Justiz www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb (accessed 05-08-2010).
60 Civil Code of the Netherlands art 6:258(1). Translation taken from Warendorf et al Civil Code of the 
Netherlands 714.
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The PECL rules, favoured by the SALC, use a vague standard of whether 
an obligation has become “excessively onerous” to determine whether redress 
for changed circumstances is permitted.61 If the change has simply made 
the obligation “more onerous” then discharge is not allowed.62 The intention 
is clearly to emphasise the importance of contractual certainty, while still 
allowing for discharge in extreme circumstances. The SALC does not give any 
motivation as to why it selected this particular article for its draft Bill, which 
leaves a reader in the dark as to why the equivalent provision in the Unidroit 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, for example, was overlooked.
The PICC provision is noticeably similar to that of the PECL, but there are 
certain important differences. Article 6.2.2 of the PICC reads as follows:
“There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract 
either because the cost of a party’s performance has increased or because the value of the performance 
a party receives has diminished, and
(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the 
contract;
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the disadvantaged party at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract;
(c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and
(d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party.”63
The PICC formula does a good job of specifying to parties and to judicial 
officers exactly what the criteria for redress are. Rather than a subjective 
notion of what is “excessively onerous”, the PICC requires a shift in the 
reciprocal values of performance under that contract (fundamental alteration 
of the equilibrium of the contract). The list of checkpoints (a) to (d) is 
also more comprehensive than the list to be found in the equivalent PECL 
formulation64 with the inclusion of a new ground (c) that the events be beyond 
the control of the disadvantaged party. If the provisions of these model rules 
are to be subjected to purposive interpretation, however, it is likely that an 
adjudicator would focus on their similarities in effect, rather than differences 
in semantics. Particularly since this paper advocates a common law solution, 
a South African judge adopting this approach might pragmatically state that 
a threshold test should be that there has been a fundamental alteration in the 
equilibrium of the contract, which is to be judged with reference to whether 
performance has become excessively onerous for one party.
61 PECL art 6:111(2). This standard is taken from the equivalent provision in art 1467 of the Italian Civil 
Code.
62 PECL art 6:111(1).
63 PICC art 6.2.2.
64 PECL art 6:111(2) reads as follows:
   “If, however, performance of the contract becomes excessively onerous because of a change of 
circumstances, the parties are bound to enter into negotiations with a view to adapting the contract or 
ending it, provided that:
   (a)  the change of circumstances occurred after the time of conclusion of the contract,
   (b)  the possibility of a change of circumstances was not one which could reasonably have been taken 
into account at the time of conclusion of the contract, and
   (c)  the risk of the change of circumstances is not one which, according to the contract, the party 
affected should be required to bear”.
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As far as the individual criteria (a) to (d) go, a major difference between 
these model rules and for example German or Dutch law, is that the frustrating 
event must have occurred after the conclusion of the contract (criterion (a)).65 
In the South African context the PICC approach is preferable, since the 
law of common mistake is sufficiently developed to deal with a change in 
circumstances which occurs prior to the contract’s conclusion.66 Criterion (b) 
requires that the frustrating event should not have been reasonably foreseeable 
at the time of contracting, which is an eminently sensible requirement and 
will limit the instances in which relief is available. Criteria (c) and (d) rule 
that the frustrating event should neither have been self-created nor should a 
contracting party have assumed the risk of its occurrence. Again, these rules 
on the assumption of risk are already largely present in the South African law 
of supervening impossibility and to transpose them to the realm of changed 
circumstances would be a logical adjustment.67
As should by now be apparent, the argument advanced here is that the 
generality of the PICC formulation makes it the ideal model on which South 
African courts can base a new rule to deal with changed circumstances. This 
formulation synthesises the best of the various municipal doctrines, while 
avoiding idiosyncrasies such as the lack of a doctrine of common mistake 
in German law.68 For the sake of completeness, attention should also be paid 
to the third major international set of model rules, the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference, which represents the latest attempt to establish a model law 
for the whole of Europe.69 The DCFR deals with changed circumstances in 
Book III at article 1:110, with the threshold test that performance must have 
become “so onerous because of an exceptional change of circumstances that it 
is manifestly unjust to hold the debtor to the obligation”.70 Again there is the 
emphasis on contractual certainty, so that obligations which are simply “more 
onerous” to perform remain binding.71 Although, as in the equivalent PECL 
and PICC provisions, there are further limitations to this test at article 1:110(3), 
the result is largely the same. The major changes in the DCFR formula involve 
the inclusion of a requirement that the change be “exceptional”, as well as 
the exchange of the “excessively onerous” standard for one of “manifest 
injustice”. However, again these differences are minor. Thus while the DCFR 
formulation adds further weight to the provisions of the PICC formulation 
through their reiteration, the PICC formula is better. A judge who disagrees 
65 Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 346-347 explain that German law does not deal with common 
mistake in the BGB and that this class of cases therefore falls to be dealt with under the German Civil 
Code § 313. Hartkamp & Tillema Contract Law in the Netherlands (1995) 125-126 note that the distinction 
between common mistake and frustration is not drawn in BW art 6:258, where discharge on the ground of 
changed circumstances is permitted for both situations.
66 The leading South African case on common mistake is Dickinson Motors (Pty) Ltd v Oberholzer 1952 1 
SA 443 (A). See also Van Reenen Steel v Smith NO 2002 4 SA 264 (SCA) para 9.
67 Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v Owner of MV Snow Crystal 2008 4 SA 111 (SCA) para 28; Van 
der Merwe et al Contract 543-544; Christie Law of Contract 475.
68 Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 346-347.
69 Von Bar & Clive Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law I (2009) 2.
70 DCFR III 1:110(2).
71 DCFR III 1:110(1).
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with this approach in South Africa could read all three formulations together 
and adopt the emergent purpose of these provisions, which is clearly the same.
Thus whether a change in circumstances results in increased expense 
of performance for the supplier or decreased value of the performance to 
the recipient, redress should be permitted, provided the change meets the 
threshold of sufficient weightiness. This threshold test is different in different 
jurisdictions, but the best approach seems to be that of the international model 
rules of contracting. The aggregate approach of the PICC, the PECL and the 
DCFR should thus be adopted as the new common law rule in South Africa. 
Once the rule has been formulated, however, the important question arises as 
to what remedies will be available under this new rule.
4  Remedies consequent upon a finding that there has been a 
fundamental change in circumstances
The favoured procedure of all three systems of model rules mentioned above 
following the occurrence of a frustrating event is for the disadvantaged party to 
request renegotiations.72 Should this prove unsuccessful, a court may discharge 
or modify the contract. This type of situation is based on the good faith regime 
which governs proceedings under all three systems of model rules.73 As official 
comment C to the DCFR provision notes, a party to a contract is entitled to 
request renegotiation of that contract as a matter of course; the interesting 
feature of these rules is that judicial intervention is made conditional upon 
there already having been a good faith attempt to reach settlement. A similar 
approach is taken in both the PECL and the PICC, although the PECL threatens 
a damages award for a failure to respond to a request to renegotiate.74 In the 
South African jurisdiction a leading contract authority has opined that this 
type of approach is unlikely to be successful, due to the centrality of the value 
of contractual certainty.75 This view extends also to the alternative of judicial 
adaptation.76 It is time to revisit this issue, since the importance attached to 
fairness in contracting is changing and in any event this approach is not as 
greatly at variance with South African law as one might think.
As noted above, it has always been an option for a South African party to 
request renegotiation. Freedom of contract allows for this. What has changed, 
however, is that whereas in the past the non-disadvantaged party could have 
stood on its rights under the letter of the contract and refused to budge, today 
this should be considered unfair, provided the change in circumstances was 
sufficiently fundamental. Thus a court when faced with this type of dispute 
should first of all apply the threshold test as to the severity of the effect of 
the frustrating event as discussed above and if the change is found to meet 
this test, then the court is faced with two alternatives: either discharge the 
72 PICC art 6.2.3; PECL art 6:111(2)-111(3); DCFR III 1:110(2)-110(3).
73 The PICC contains a good faith provision in art 1.7 and art 5.1.3 creates a duty to co-operate. The PECL 
art 1:201 contains a general good faith provision, as does the DCFR III 1:103. 
74 For criticism of the PECL approach see comment C to DCFR III 1:110.
75 Christie “Our Law of Contract and the Modern Lex Mercatoria” in Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ 
Kerr (2006) 59 73.
76 73.
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contract or modify it. Discharge would be the classic remedy and is favoured 
in common law countries77 as well as South Africa78 as the correct approach to 
a situation of impossibility at present. This is not the ideal solution, however, 
and gives rise to all sorts of enrichment difficulties.79 Discharge should thus 
be the outcome of last resort, since this is an all-or-nothing approach.
There are circumstances, however, where this will be the unavoidable 
outcome. Markesinis gives the example from German law of a dispute decided 
in 1976 concerning the transfer of a professional football player from one club 
to another.80 This player had, unbeknown to both clubs involved, accepted a 
bribe to lose a game before the time of transfer. The Bundesgerichtshof held 
that the actions of the player had made him “worthless” to both clubs, and upset 
the fundamental basis of the transaction. Due to the circumstances of the case, 
revision of the contract under the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage 
was not possible and hence the agreement was discharged and the return of 
the transfer fee was ordered. If discharge is the unavoidable outcome of a case, 
this remedy must be enforced.
Contract modification should also not be dismissed too quickly in the South 
African context, indeed it occurs already in certain contexts, as alien as this 
remedy may appear to some commentators.81 Consider the problem of partial 
enforcement of restraint of trade agreements. In National Chemsearch (SA) 
Pty Ltd v Borrowman82 (“National Chemsearch”) Botha J held that under 
appropriately limited circumstances, a judge could formulate a new agreement 
for the parties which partially enforced the restraining provision.83 This 
approach did away with the so-called “blue pencil test”, which relied upon the 
severability of the offending portions.84 The National Chemsearch approach of 
contractual adaptation was confirmed by the Appellate Division in Magna Alloys 
and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis.85 While this is simply a limitation of a too-
widely worded provision, rather than a whole new contract, it does evidence a 
willingness on the part of the courts to achieve justice by contract modification.86
Obviously contract modification would also be an order of last resort and a 
negotiated settlement would be the ultimate goal of proceedings. The notorious 
court-ordered adjustment of the contract in the US case of Aluminum Co of 
77 For English law see The Super Servant Two [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 8; McKendrick “Discharge by 
Frustration” in Chitty on Contracts 1522. For US law see UCC § 2-615; Second Restatement of Contracts 
§ 261; Nehf “Impossibility” in Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts 14 (2001) 5.
78 For authority see n 5 above.
79 In the English jurisdiction the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 had to be enacted to address 
this problem. In South Africa this issue is dealt with by the common law, see Kudu Granite Operations 
(Pty) Ltd v Caterna Ltd 2003 5 SA 193 (SCA); Christie The Law of Contract 472.
80 BGH NJW 1976, 565 as cited in Markesinis et al The German Law of Contract 347.
81 Christie “Our Law of Contract and the Modern Lex Mercatoria” in Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr 73.
82 1979 3 SA 1092 (T).
83 1116D-1117G.
84 See the discussion in Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudré (Pty) Ltd 1977 4 SA 494 (N) 507C-D.
85 1984 4 SA 874 (A) 896E. See also CTP Ltd v Argus Holdings Ltd 1995 4 SA 774 (A) 787E-F.
86 It should be noted that explicit contract modification would be against established precedent in South 
Africa, where the courts have been reluctant in the past to make an entirely new agreement for the parties. 
See for example Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 2005 2 SA 202 (SCA) para 17. 
Comparative law indicates that this is out of line with international trends, and is evidence of an old-
fashioned approach which takes contractual certainty as its only goal.
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America v Essex Group, Inc87 should bear witness to the danger of too liberal 
an application of this remedy. There a carefully negotiated pricing mechanism 
was abandoned by the court in favour of its own mechanism,88 a decision which 
Dawson has described as “grotesque”.89 The caution of the relevant comment in 
the Draft Common Frame of Reference bears directly on this point:
“Any modification must only be such, however, as will make the obligation reasonable and equitable 
in the new circumstances. It would not be reasonable and equitable if the effect of the court’s order 
were to introduce a new hardship or injustice.”90
Ideally it should be the parties to the contract themselves who arrive at 
some type of settlement and perhaps a court could enforce some sort of duty 
to renegotiate in good faith on the parties as an intermediate step to actually 
modifying the contract itself. This type of duty was enforced by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd91 
(“Southernport Developments”). This case was slightly different to the present 
scenario, in that the duty to renegotiate had been established in the parties’ 
own contract and was enforceable at the instance of an arbitrator. The duty to 
renegotiate following a change of circumstances would, however, be based on 
a common law rule, or an ex lege term of the contract, which means that the 
connection between Southernport Developments and the present argument 
is fairly concrete.92 A court could add mettle to this duty to renegotiate by 
making a temporary order advising the parties what it thinks would be a just 
outcome to their dispute and then sending them away to attempt to reach 
a settlement before a return date. This would avoid the type of outcome as 
evidenced in Alcoa v Essex Group93 above and would provide a basis for 
reaching agreement.
In sum, renegotiation is the best means of equitably solving disputes 
following a change of circumstances. Fairness in contracting requires that the 
non-disadvantaged party entertain a request to renegotiate by its counterpart. 
An attempt at renegotiation should be a condition precedent for access to the 
courts to resolve a dispute involving a frustrated contract. If, however, no 
resolution can be reached by the parties, then court intervention is necessary. 
The circumstances of the case will determine whether adaptation or discharge 
is more appropriate as a remedy. The court should seek to do what is fair and 
not to impose new hardship on the parties by its ultimate order.
5  Conclusion
There has been an important shift in emphasis in South African contract 
law, away from black letter contractual certainty and towards fairness in 
87 499 F Supp 53 (1980).
88 80.
89 Dawson “Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States” 1984 64 BUL Rev 1 26.
90 Comment E to DCFR III 1:110.
91 2005 2 SA 202 (SCA) para 17.
92 It should be noted, however, that in this case the court was emphasising the fact that it was not creating a 
new agreement for the parties (Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 2005 2 SA 202 (SCA) 
para 17).
93 499 F Supp 53 (1980).
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contracting. This shift has the authority of the Constitutional Court behind it 
and the mandate which the Barkhuizen case places on all future courts must 
be given effect to. One such area, which has traditionally been ignored in the 
South African jurisdiction, is the problem of changed circumstances. To place 
the burden of a frustrating event on one party alone is simply not fair and 
some sort of sharing of losses and gains must take place.
To allow the hardship problem to be addressed on equitable grounds alone is 
not satisfactory, however. There is too much scope left for the discretion of an 
individual judge and there are no guidelines in place to give him or her direction. 
Thus while fairness in contracting demands that this problem be addressed, a 
discretion based on fairness alone is not the final solution. Rather this should 
underlie the introduction a new set of rules to deal with changed circumstances.
Provided a threshold test is met, remedies would then be available in South 
African law to address any situation of hardship. This threshold test is best 
formulated in the form of a common law rule which will ask whether there 
has been a fundamental alteration in the equilibrium of the contract due to 
an exceptional change in circumstances, so that performance has become 
excessively onerous for one party. Further requirements are that the hardship 
should have occurred after the conclusion of the contract, should not have 
been foreseeable at the time of contracting and should not have been self-
created or within the sphere of a party’s assumed risk.
If a party believes hardship is present in its case, it is entitled to request 
renegotiation of the contract and the opposing party is bound by the prevailing 
climate of fairness in contracting to entertain such a request. Should all 
attempts at self-resolution fail, discharge or renegotiation may be awarded 
by a court. This will ensure that gaps in contracts created by the occurrence 
of unforeseeable contingencies are addressed in a fair manner. This also 
vindicates the basic approach advocated by Fried that losses and gains 
consequent upon frustration be shared.94 This apportionment of the burden 
caused by a change of circumstances shows the concern for one’s fellow 
human being necessary to do simple justice between people.
SUMMARY
South African law does not make provision for the impact of fundamentally changed circumstances 
on a contract if the change does not result in objective impossibility. This is not in line with most 
other leading legal systems around the world, as well as with the foremost bodies of supranational 
contract law rules, such as the Unidroit Principles. When a situation of hardship arises, this creates 
a gap in a contract, which the parties did not foresee and which the law should fill. Ideally resultant 
losses and gains should be equitably split between the parties. The development of notions of fairness 
in contracting has reached a point where public policy could require that a situation of changed 
circumstances be addressed, to achieve a fair result inter partes. This normative principle should 
underlie the adoption of new rules to deal with hardship in South Africa, which could be based on best 
international practice as gleaned from comparative study.
94 Fried Contract as Promise 69-70 (cited above).
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